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A Way of Comparing Lévi-Strauss and Lacan 
Yvan Simonis  
Anthropologist and Psychoanalyst (GIFRIC) 
 
This essay attempts to compare and contrast the different conceptions of the human subject in 
Claude Lévi-Strauss and Jacques Lacan, with specific reference to the notions of art and the act.  
For this occasion I will draw on my reading of structuralism, developed elsewhere, as a “logic of the 
aesthetic perception of the social.” Structuralism apparently distances itself from the act, but it 
presupposes the act as a foundation.  Psychoanalysis takes the act as its point of departure and 
seeks its art.  In each case, the human subject is conceived differently.  Nonetheless, the exercise 
appended to this essay proposes a space in which these two approaches can perhaps encounter 
each other on the common ground of structure.   
 
Writing about Claude Lévi-Strauss to open a debate with Lacan about art, the act, the 
subject, the unconscious, and language—nothing less—is of course risky. While proposing 
some crucial differences between structuralism and Lacanian psychoanalysis concerning 
these several concepts, I am indeed afraid to reduce structuralism to a caricature that will 
be too easy to criticize. 
This short paper is certainly far too condensed to do justice to the magisterial work 
of Lévi-Strauss solely by submitting it to the critique of psychoanalysis. Neither of these two 
approaches to the human phenomenon can assimilate the other one. Yet they overlap on a 
few points without really being in agreement. As you will see, I propose to situate the main 
differences between Lévi-Strauss and Lacan around their ideas about art and the act. For 
Lévi-Strauss I would say that structuralism is the art of supposing the work of the act by 
distancing oneself from it, and for Lacan I would say that he turns around the acts of the 
Real, which reveal where the subject stands and looks to produce his own work of art. 
 
1. Lévi-Strauss often hesitated. He was aware that acts of human intervention produce 
the raw material for structuralist analysis––things like social organization, kinship, rituals, 
myths, techniques, etc.––but he thought that these products kept in them the trace of 
something that escaped the consciousness of their authors, and that this something was 
located at a level that ties all these products to one another. Drawing inspiration from the 
works of Roman Jakobson and Ferdinand de Saussure, Lévi-Strauss argued that all social 
products are marked by the symbolic organization that is characteristic of human languages. 
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These linguists tell us that language implies an unconscious articulation of phonemes 
that are distinguishable by distinctive features, and form between them a system that is a 
necessary condition for speaking meaningfully––and therefore for acting meaningfully. They 
add that we are by no means the authors of this system. Lévi-Strauss starts from the 
hypothesis that all human productions also carry a systematic level of articulation that 
escapes them by remaining unconscious. Retrieving the traces of this unconscious 
articulation in all human productions becomes the only real interest of structuralism. This is 
why Lévi-Strauss jumped from kinship to rituals and later from myths to music, yet moved 
further and further away from acts in order to emphasize their conditions of possibility and 
their dependency. 
When so examined, myths turn out actually to be extremely inventive explorations–
–of nature, the body, events, social rules, feelings, good and evil, or anything that is human 
or natural. Myths use a number of encodings to make everything meaningful in the 
construction of their stories. Here structuralism acts like an actor who reads the logic 
implied by the work of myths that “think themselves” through him. The ways in which these 
myths are rooted socially, politically, economically, and philosophically, or culturally, locally, 
and in the family, are only relevant as accidents, supposing acts, that trigger the inner work 
of mythical logic. 
As Lévi-Strauss sees it, mythical thinking expresses clearly but by a paradoxical 
detour his secret hope to reveal the framework of the logic that sustains and defines the 
real. Why is this detour paradoxical? On the one hand, the imagination seen in myths may 
appear delirious, but it turns out to be even more regulated than any human production by 
the constant work of a logic of differences that deploys, beyond the mythical imaginary, the 
prodigious diversity of codes in which the activities of the mind are inscribed. 
Lévi-Strauss counts on events that have become inscribed in the form of a work––an 
“œuvre.” He does not underestimate the importance of acts for thinking. Indeed, there is 
no structural analysis without the work of events-accidents. 
As he says: “In so far as early art, primitive art and the 'primitive' periods of 
professional painting are the only ones which do not date, they owe it to this dedication of 
the accidental to the service of execution and so to the use, which they try to make 
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complete, of the raw datum as the empirical material of something meaningful.” (The Savage 
Mind 29)  
By what may seem like a long detour, the structural analysis of myths often sheds 
light on history by going back to it with new hypotheses on how past acts inscribed in 
various encodings testify to the vigor of conflicts and exchanges between neighboring 
peoples whose myths and differential development structuralism studies. Experience and 
the thinking that develops through it are coded in multiple ways and suppose the work of 
number of previous acts.  
Encodings use a large number of natural (sun, moon, stars, animal behaviors, diverse 
forms of objects of any sort, etc.) or social forms (habitats, customs, rites, etc.) that the 
mind does not invent but that give the mind material for coding and thinking. These are not 
limited to the sexual code. For Lévi-Strauss, the sexual code was insufficient for reading the 
variety of consequences produced by the acts-events of even the Oedipus myth. This is why 
he criticized Freud’s reading of that myth in Totem and Taboo. 
Structuralism has a sense of temporal depth. It openly admits that structural analysis 
presupposes acts, events, or ancient accidents. “In the end,” said Lévi-Strauss in 1971, “if 
the customs of neighboring peoples display a symmetrical relation, one should not only seek 
the reason for this in some mysterious law of nature or the mind. This geometrical 
perfection also sums up, in the present mode, more or less conscious but countless efforts 
accumulated by history. . .” (1973: 300). 
Lévi-Strauss thus grounds human activities (kinship, the economy, politics, art, and all 
the events that he calls accidents) in various encodings that transmit to one another the 
function of finding meaning. Little by little, this work reveals that these coded inscriptions fix 
humans in the symbolic, conceived as the various parts of the possible logics regulated by 
the mind that keeps in unconscious reserve all the possible parts. Little by little, this 
reduction operates, and will verify that what we believe is unique to humans actually reveals 
our anchoring in the materiality of the universe. 
Curiously, Lévi-Strauss uses the metaphor of art and artistic activity to explain the 
relevance of the structuralist project. In Entretiens avec Claude Lévi-Strauss (1961), George 
Charbonnier asks Lévi-Strauss: “For you, is the artist someone who aspires to language?” Lévi-
Strauss responds as follows: 
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He is someone who aspires the object into language, if you allow me this formulation. He 
faces an object, and in the face of this object, there is really an extraction, an aspiration, that 
turns this object, which used to be a being of nature, into a being of culture. And it is in this 
sense that, as I was saying earlier, the classic phenomenon in which ethnologists are 
interested, namely the passage from nature to culture, finds in art a privileged manifestation. 
(131) 
 
But this is not only about the passage from nature to culture. For Lévi-Strauss, what 
teaching does this passage contain? In response to a reaction by Charbonnier reminding him 
that the artist also wants to leave culture to move toward nature, Lévi-Strauss says this: 
 
This is not contradictory, insofar as the promotion of an object into a sign, if it succeeds, 
must bring to light some fundamental properties that are common both to the sign and to 
the object, a structure which is manifest in the sign and which is normally hidden in the 
object, but which, thanks to the plastic or poetic representation of that object, appears 
suddenly, and incidentally allows the passage to all sorts of objects. There is a double 
movement which, through the medium of this linguistic experience, allows to discover or to 
notice some normally hidden features of the object, and these are the very features that the 
object shares in common with the structure and the mode of functioning of the human 
mind. (131–32) 
 
Let’s add the two lines that immediately follow: 
Charbonnier: “I believe we can say that there is art only on the condition that the second 
movement is implemented.” 
Lévi-Strauss: “Certainly.” 
 
This aspiration of nature toward culture leads, as we can see, to the paradoxical 
discovery of a commonality of the mind with the object. In the innermost being of either 
one of them, something structural triumphs, of which language is the finest expression, and 
that objects also express when they are “speaking.” 
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When one considers the work of art as the product of an activity that renounces 
sensible aspects by acquiring intelligible dimensions, and as a choice among solutions that 
could have taken a different face, the solution that was eventually adopted also reveals as a 
watermark those that were rejected. Here I quote Lévi-Strauss again:  
 
The choice of a solution involves a modification of the result to which another solution 
would have led, and the observer is in effect presented with the general picture of these 
permutations at the same time as the particular solution offered. He is thereby transformed 
into an active participant without even being aware of it. (The Savage Mind 24) 
 
II. The structuralism of Lévi-Strauss takes us, as we can see, in a direction that moves 
us away from Lacanian perspectives. 
Lévi-Strauss and psychoanalysis agree about the importance of signifiers. Both are 
suspicious of consciousness and the self. Lévi-Strauss once said, “Whoever starts to settle in 
the supposedly obvious facts of the self will not come out of it” (La Pensée Sauvage 329). 
Psychoanalysis has no trouble adopting this perspective, but fundamentally differs from 
structuralism as soon as it discusses the subject, desire, or the acts of the Real. 
Both speak about the unconscious, about what escapes us and grounds us, but the 
fundamental differences quickly appear. 
Psychoanalysis goes toward a Real that inscribes itself, a Real that is located beyond 
the symbolic. Structuralism stays on the side of language, whose model it considers 
unsurpassable. There are also differences between Lévi-Strauss and psychoanalysis 
concerning what remains unconscious. For structuralism, what escapes us and remains 
unconscious is the human mind and all its possibilities. For psychoanalysis, what remains 
unconscious is what cannot be represented, what is not of the order of fantasy. These two 
perspectives are oriented in opposite directions. They intersect, but their journey 
irremediably takes them away from each other. 
Under the impact of the linguistic model used by Lévi-Strauss, Lacan had endorsed 
the priority of signifiers organized in structures. He had thus moved away from the 
unconscious associated with the repressed to situate it progressively as a translation of a 
chain of signifiers. Later, Lacan put at the center of his approach the concepts of Enjoyment 
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(la Jouissance) and the Real, of béance (“gap,” “chasm”) and suture (“stitching”). He thus 
moved from structure to knots that are no longer a matter for linguistic models. 
“My saying--that the unconscious is structured like a language--is not of the realm of 
linguistics.” Lacan had specified (cited by Toboul 316). Lacan had also humorously proposed 
to call “linguistry” the knowledge about language that psychonanalysis carves (317). 
In Structural Anthropology, Lacan had noticed Lévi-Strauss’s early famous texts (“The 
Sorcerer and his Magic” and “The Effectiveness of Symbols”), which were at the root of 
later debates in psychoanalysis. There, Lacan had found the “structuralist definition” of 
magic: “it supposes that signifiers respond as such to signifiers. The signifier of nature is 
called by the signifier of incantation. It is ‘metaphorically mobilized.’” As Annie Tardits 
comments in Drach et Toboul, “the discreetly provocative point consists in bringing this 
‘bridge of correspondences’––which is implied by magic between these two locations of the 
signifier––closer to the correlation insistently highlighted by Lévi-Strauss between the 
classifications and combinations of thought––savage or not––and the architecture of 
molecules discovered by modern biology: a magical ‘bridge of correspondences,’ if there is 
any. . . .” (209). This was going to pose problems. Marcel Drach writes, 
 
This taking of distance is indicated, in the Seminar L’Angoisse in 1962, by the theme of 
béance. Thus is marked the impossible, the symbolization of which is limited by Lacan’s Real, 
against the Enlightenment materialism professed by Lévi-Strauss, which puts the symbolic in 
continuity with empirical reality through the medium of brain structure. (Drach et Toboul 15)  
 
Where is the subject in these matters? 
For Lévi-Strauss, the subject is reduced to the symbolic function that forces and 
appropriates the subject when events take place. 
For Lacan, the subject is referred to desire under the recurrent impact of the Real 
beneath the symbolic, the Real being the absent cause of the subject of desire. 
Lévi-Strauss does not go beyond mental representations and has no room for a “lack 
to jouissance.” He went no further than the equivalent of a degree zero on the side of the 
subject. To him, there is an unthinkable that explains affect, feelings––a leftover, but Lévi-
Strauss is not interested in accounting for it. Subjectivity is reduced to the muddles of the 
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self and its lived experience, a kind of flower produced by the work (which escapes the self) 
of the chance meeting of ancient geological layers whose maneuvers we do not control. 
For Lévi-Strauss, comments Philippe Mengue in Drach et Toboul, 
 
the empty slot is simply a passive formal condition that enables mutations, the 
transformations of a given order. For Lacan, on the contrary, the structure is structuring 
only from an active void that plays the role of a quasi-cause, an absent cause, in the 
structuring of the subject as a subject of desire. (228) 
 
“Indeed,” writes Toboul, “for Lévi-Strauss, the structure imposed the order of the 
oppositive difference that language constitutes. . . . But the paradigm of enjoyment 
(jouissance) jostles the subtle balance between the lack (béance) and the structure. A new 
regime of difference finds its legitimacy” (Drach et Toboul 278). And, Toboul continues, 
 
. . . the signifier no longer maintains itself as master of the game, and the subject of the 
unconscious comes to change names. To retrieve the radicality of Freud, all foundations are 
revoked, and to foundationlessness responds semblance. All the stabilities enabled by the 
Symbolic waver. It is the time of the Real; a new regime of difference needs to be produced 
that will not be that which structures language. The linguistic model exits the stage.  (Drach 
et Toboul 279) 
 
The Real of la Jouissance creates an asymmetry through an event that is not 
integrated into the established symmetries. Structuralism contains the art of supposing this 
kind of event, but only after it has brought about other symmetries, whereas psychoanalysis 
speaks of acts of the Real that require subjects to find their art. 
The Real acts and the body is at stake in its inscriptions. We need to begin from the 
concrete, the sensible. Structuralism goes toward what it thinks is a logic of the sensible, a 
logic of forms that is fashioned without ever leaving the sensible, without going through 
abstraction, nor even through speech. For structuralism, meaning is on the side of silence 
and music.1 
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Where the Real makes an act, one must go to the details, not to substitutive 
generalities. The Real has no desire, in my view, but it leads to desire, it imposes it, it 
reveals desire through acts that inform us that we are not confined by the dictates of 
mental representations and therefore of fantasies. 
Don’t forget the trauma which is implied by the work of the Real. “Thus trauma is 
the mark that the subject is not reducible to being represented,” says Alain Vanier (Drach et 
Toboul 259).. Trauma is this strike by the Real that establishes the subject as a lack of 
Jouissance that is indicated by the object a. 
The question that is asked when we say “The Real acts” is “Does it act out of 
nothing, ex nihilo?” Answering yes to this question would apparently reinforce the mystery, 
whereas answering no would imply that the Real is each person’s Real and is inscribed for 
the subject. 
The acts of the Real are already snapped up by desire. This, in my view, reveals that 
the subject desired these acts and that he suddenly faces the ethical choice of recognizing 
these acts as his own. Citing Lacan (2001:200)Toboul says, “. . . we notice that the being of 
the subject is the stitching (suture) of a lack” (304). As we can see, we are far from the 
unitary subject: “The subject re-breaches itself of being at once effect of the mark and 
support for its lack” (305).  “. . . the subject is what responds to the mark by what the mark 
lacks” (Lacan 2001: 200). 
The mark that we evoke here is like a scar, an inscription, the result of a reaction to 
a hallucination within the subject in a body that bears witness henceforth to the 
disorganization of the organic realm by the work of the letter, the precise point of the 
relation between the Symbolic and the Real around a void that the Symbolic ensures and 
therefore around a loss, a lack, which nourishes desire and the drive.   
“The subject of the unconscious functions, then, like the paradoxical point by which 
the structure ensures its coherence, but upon an exclusion,” writes Toboul  (Drach et 
Toboul 278). 
As we can see and as Claude-Noële Pickmann rightly reminds us (Drach et Toboul 
107-114), the knotting together of what escapes and what accesses the signifier, of the 
unthinkable and the symbolic, and of the gap and meaning (semblance), does not serve to 
make a synthesis or a unitary totality. 
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Conclusion 
Psychoanalysis, it seems to me, is a science of the morning. It desires to understand 
how the beginnings of the subject and his inscription in the group are knotted together. It 
knows that these beginnings are always there, and that the beginnings of the subject are the 
very source of his artistic reactions, of the acts which do and undo him. This position 
indeed conveys quite another conception of the subject than the one proposed by 
structuralism. 
Psychoanalysis strives to read the inscriptions of the Real on the body of the subject. 
But this doesn’t mean that under the pretext of the reaction of the subject to these 
inscriptions we should not pay attention to the encounters between fantasies and the body. 
Here, Lévi-Strauss should teach us something by drawing our attention toward other 
locations of these inscriptions.   
Structuralism, on the other hand, is a science of the evening. It is interested in the 
ancient outcomes of the history of these subjects. For structuralism, the accumulated 
inscriptions of this activity reveal through the objects it has produced that humanity is 
irremediably inserted in materiality and that the mind is only the delegate of the things it 
gives voice to. 
Lévi-Strauss is right to offer no privilege to the human species, which, as he said, 
“will disappear without leaving a trace on the scale of the planets,” and he indefatigably tried 
to relate this species to a materiality that plays itself out through it. 
But, as Richard Rechtman says with some humor, “structural logic supposes the 
emancipation of subjectivity” (Drach and Toboul 194). And indeed, structural logic owes 
nothing to each person’s subjectivity. 
At the end of this text, let me draw your attention to the following appendix. For those 
who know Lévi-Strauss and Lacan, I propose an exercise which is more proximate to what 
both authors mean when they talk about structure. In my view, one can immediately see the 
implications of their understanding of the notion of structure and then of the conceptions of 
the subject, art, and the act. 
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Appendix 
 
Fx (a) : Fy (b)   Fx (b) : Fa-1 (y)2 
 
Let us try to use this famous formula by Lévi-Strauss that he always used to work and 
explain what he was doing—a formula bearing the logic of the Moebius strip or of a Klein’s 
bottle. Its main logical feature is to trace the work of the inversion that has a closing effect 
and maintains the frame of the dynamic of a group of transformation. By way of illustration, 
let me itemize what the components of this formula would become in a psychoanalytical 
space: 
(a) would be the self 
(b) would be the body 
“a - 1” would be the unconscious 
x would be knowledge (savoir) 
y would be desire 
 
The formula would thus read as follows: 
 
The knowledge (fx) carried by the self (a) has the same type of relation 
with desire (fy) inscribed on the body (b) as knowledge (fx) inscribed on 
the body (b) does with what remains unconscious (fa-1) within desire (fy). 
 
We therefore need to ask what type of relation would be roughly similar on both sides of 
the formula. 
I would say that the formula denotes a relation of dependency and therefore a 
hierarchical relation that is founded on a non-relation, that is, a gap, a hole, an irreducible 
ignorance. . . and the impossibility of reducing the subject to any single level. 
We are here on the territory of Lacanian knots. It would probably be fruitful to try to 
re-write some Borromean knots with this formula. This is a ground for a possible discussion 
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between structuralism and psychoanalysis, and perhaps this discussion would show that 
Levi-Straussian formulas did not exclude the work of béance. 
 
 
Translated by Fabien Simonis3 
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1 Marcel Drach (Drach et Toboul 170–71) makes the interesting suggestion that we should 
remain attentive to what Lévi-Strauss says about music when he tries to valorize access to 
musical experience, starting with the babbling of infants, in which the boundary of phonemes 
and music is at stake through the establishment of signifying sounds, but for Lévi-Strauss 
music is not on the side of Lacan’s language, otherwise he would have been interested in 
concrete music rather than abhorring it. For Levi-Strauss, music goes beyond the symbolic; 
it is the very example of the rediscovery of logic and the sensible; it is at once logic and 
sense-perception; it avoids all of the risks of the symbolic.  Marcel Drach seems to tell us 
that that babbling of infants bears witness perhaps to a moment when one can still perceive 
the manner in which the positioning of logic and of the sensible dimension is established.   
But it seems to me that the babbling of infants, far from any apparent logic, is based rather 
on the confusion that Levi-Strauss criticizes in concrete, serial, and dodecaphonic music, all 
of which pretends to ground music in an aleatory logic, and distances itself from its 
anchoring in the experience of a sensible dimension inscribed in nature.   
2 This formula always inspired the work of Levi-Strauss from Anthropologie Structurale (1958 : 
252) on.   As he reminds those who would underestimate its importance in Du miel aux 
cendres : Mythologiques 2 (1966 : 212), “ it has not ceased guiding us.”    
3 I gratefully thank my son Fabien Simonis for taking charge of the translation of this text 
only a few days before I originally presented it at the seminar of GIFRIC in spring 2010.  I 
also gratefully thank Jeffrey Librett who believed this essay was of a potential interest for 
the readers of the journal he is in charge of, for pushing me to rework parts of the text. I 
am of course entirely responsible for what I have done, in this respect, within a very tight 
deadline. 
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